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Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic
L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff
ABSTRACT: The doctrine of self-defense evaluates the reasonableness of
criminality judgments. Yet, it fails to account for how non-conscious
cognitions place those who are stereotyped as criminal at greater risk of
mistaken judgments of criminality—sometimes with deadly consequences.
Studies reveal, for example, that people are more likely to see weapons in the
hands of unarmed black men than unarmed white men, and to more
quickly shoot them as a result. Because self-defense doctrine does not attend
to these judgment errors, it fails to interrogate how, if at all, these mistakes
should affect assessments of reasonableness. Drawing from powerful and
well-established mind sciences research, this Essay introduces a concept that
we term the “suspicion heuristic.” This concept explains how non-conscious
processes can lead to systematic and predictable errors in judgments of
criminality—and influence subsequent behaviors—regardless of conscious
racial attitudes. This Essay argues that in order to provide more equal
protection, security, and liberty to all victims of violence, the law of selfdefense should account for the suspicion heuristic in its assessments of
reasonableness. This Essay traces the broad outlines of a theoretical and
legal framework for doing so.
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INTRODUCTION
The Trayvon Martin killing has caused our nation, again, to confront
both our vicious legacy of racial violence and the long road towards racial
equity that we still have to travel. Regardless of what specific facts emerge in
the case, the killing of this black teen sparked outrage and resentment along
familiar racial lines. Not surprisingly, it also devolved quickly into discussions
about George Zimmerman—Martin’s killer—and the content of his
character. Is he a bigot?1 If so, was that bigotry responsible for Martin’s
death? While it is tempting to fixate on this possibility, there is significant
scientific evidence that a host of subtler mental processes can conspire to
produce racially discriminatory behaviors—even absent conscious racial bias.
These psychological processes are both predictable and pervasive, warping
the perceptions of even the most egalitarian of individuals.
This Essay argues that scholars, lawyers, and policymakers should attend
to the ways that normal psychological processes can bias judgments of
criminality in a manner inconsistent with the values of liberty, safety, and
security. Doing so is important because, sadly, killings of innocent non-white
individuals are not aberrational.2 What is required is a new legal and
theoretical framework that can account for these biases—one that does not
rely upon the fiction of the objective decision-maker or the scapegoat of the
consciously biased actor. This Essay is the first in a series of articles that
develops this framework.
In this Essay, we draw from mind sciences research to introduce a
concept that we term the “suspicion heuristic.” We use this concept to
explain how normal psychological processes that operate below the level of
conscious awareness can lead to systematic errors in judgments of
criminality. This concept provides an important new lens for scrutinizing
legal doctrines that rely upon the reasonableness of criminality judgments—
primarily self-defense and stop-and-frisks. Both doctrines use reasonableness
in an attempt to delicately balance security and liberty. In the self-defense
context, individuals are entitled to defend themselves, but only if their
actions are necessary and proportionate from the perspective of the
reasonable person. In the proactive-policing setting, law enforcement
1. See Ashley Hayes, Witnesses Tell FBI that George Zimmerman Is No Racist, CNN.COM (July
13, 2012, 7:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/justice/florida-teen-shooting/index.
html.
2. See infra notes 122–52 and accompanying text (discussing the shooting deaths of
Yoshihiro Hattori and Trayvon Martin). See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) (discussing cases).
Many of the reported cases involve police shootings of innocent non-Whites. For instance, on
February 4, 1999, four white NYPD officers shot Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African
immigrant, forty-one times while he was standing in his doorway. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict:
The Overview; 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-dialloshooting-are-acquitted-all-charges.html. Nineteen bullets hit Diallo, killing him. Id.
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officers are entitled to briefly detain, question, and cursorily search
individuals, but only if an individual’s actions give rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminality. Yet, neither doctrine attends to the systematic errors
caused by racial stereotypes that can affect judgments of criminality nor
determines how these mistakes should affect assessments of reasonableness.
As a result, these doctrines often fail to protect those individuals who have
the misfortune to be stereotyped3 as criminal—sometimes with deadly
consequences.
This Essay scrutinizes the doctrine of self-defense4 and proceeds in
three parts. Part I introduces the “suspicion heuristic” and discusses the
scientific research that supports it. Part II contemplates the implications of
the suspicion heuristic for the law of self-defense. Finally, Part III considers
the duty to retreat and argues that, in light of the suspicion heuristic, it
should be a non-discretionary component of self-defense doctrine.
I.

THE SUSPICION HEURISTIC

This Part introduces the “suspicion heuristic,” a concept we develop to
explain the predictable errors in perception, decision-making, and action
that can occur when individuals make judgments of criminality. The
suspicion heuristic links lessons from two distinct, but related, bodies of
research in the mind sciences—the study of heuristics and biases on the one
hand and the study of implicit (non-conscious) racial bias on the other. We
make this connection to explain how merely perceiving race—even absent
racial animus—can bias judgments of criminality. While both areas of
research concern themselves with how people think and process
information, they are rarely coupled in legal literature.5
Over four decades of research in both fields reveals that many of our
conscious thoughts, behaviors, and judgments are affected by mental
3. In this Essay, we define stereotypes as “the general inclination to place a person in
categories according to some easily and quickly identifiable characteristic such as age, sex,
ethnic membership, nationality or occupation, and then to attribute to him qualities believed to
be typical of members of that category.” Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and
Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976) (quoting Renato Taguiri, Person Perception, in 3 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 395, 423 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed.
1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense:
Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 369 n.2 (1996) (defining
stereotypes as “well-internalized associations regarding groups of people that result in habitually
automatic, gut-level responses” (emphasis omitted)).
4. An analysis of the suspicion heuristic and its relevance to the proactive policing
context will be forthcoming in an article tentatively titled “Suspicion Cascades.”
5. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 973
(2006) (noting that implicit racial bias “has not generally been grouped with the ‘heuristics and
biases’ uncovered by research in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics”). The first
article to link these distinct bodies of research in the legal literature was written by Christine
Jolls and Cass Sunstein. Id.
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processes beyond our ability to control volitionally. The term “suspicion
heuristic” is a gesture towards the work of Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky,
and others on heuristics and biases. This literature, recently summarized by
the Nobel Prize-winning Kahneman in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow,
refers to the human tendency to use decision-making shortcuts (heuristics).6
While these mental shortcuts allow us to understand our social worlds
quickly and accurately most of the time, they can also lead to systematic
errors in judgment.7 Because of the popularity of Kahneman’s recent work,
it seems appropriate to use the term “suspicion heuristic” to translate the
science of thinking about decisions in general to the process of assessing
suspicion. The “suspicion heuristic” can be understood as a mental shortcut
that often leads to systematic errors in determining who is and is not
suspicious.
The heuristic shortcuts that have been the subject of study in the field
of cognitive psychology are themselves vulnerable to other non-conscious
(i.e., implicit) human biases.8 In the field of social psychology, researchers
have found that implicit biases tend to disadvantage stigmatized social
groups such as Blacks,9 women,10 and the poor.11 Consequently, in order to
engage the full consequences of a “suspicion heuristic,” we review the
relevant literature on heuristics in Subpart A and the relevant literature on
implicit racial biases in Subpart B.12 Finally, in Subpart C, we intertwine the
lessons from these two bodies of research to develop the “suspicion
heuristic.”
6. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
7. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124–31 (1974).
8. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 877, 889–91 (2004).
9. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the
Decision To Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1015–22 (2007); Eberhardt, supra
note 8, at 876, 888–91; Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 302–05
(2008).
10. Brenda Major & Laurie T. O’Brien, The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 393, 396, 400, 407–08 (2005).
11. Heather E. Bullock, Class Acts: Middle-Class Responses to the Poor, in THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL DISCRIMINATION 118, 118–59 (Bernice Lott & Diane Maluso
eds., 1995).
12. We conclude these Subparts with a discussion of how non-conscious and/or automatic
decisions and associations can provoke troubling behaviors. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1–16 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000); Correll et al., supra note 9, at 1006–23 (discussing how mental processes
can lead to consequential behaviors); Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 876–93 (same); Goff et
al., supra note 9, at 292–306 (same); Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Leibold, Relations Among the
Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001) (same); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124–
31 (same).
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A. HEURISTICS AND BIASES
Heuristics are mental shortcuts or rules of thumb whereby people
reduce complex decisions to simpler assessments.13 People often utilize
heuristics to make decisions and predictions without any conscious
awareness that they are doing so.14 While heuristics are efficient given the
limitations of the human mind to process information, they can also
produce systematic errors of judgment that predictably recur in certain
situations, known as biases.15
Many of the heuristics studied by psychologists are connected to “dual
process” theories in cognitive psychology.16 According to these theories,
people use two mental processes to make judgments and process
information. System 1 refers to the fast, intuitive, and typically nonconscious mental processes that influence most conscious thought and
action—we might think of these as our “gut” feelings or intuitions. System 2
refers to processes that are slower, conscious, and deliberate. As Kahneman
writes, “The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective
experience of agency, choice, and concentration. . . . When we think of
ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has
beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do.”17
While most of us believe that we have conscious access to, and control over,
our thoughts, feelings, and judgments,18 in truth, the automatic and
13. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 98
(explaining that a heuristic is a “simple procedure that helps [people] find adequate, though
often imperfect, answers to difficult questions”). Heuristics have received significant attention
in the field of cognitive psychology. For a general discussion of heuristics, see Daniel Kahneman
& Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 49–50 (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002). For a summary of the over four decades of research in heuristic reasoning, see
KAHNEMAN, supra note 6.
14. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 97.
15. Id. at 3–4, 130; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124, 1131.
16. See generally Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 51; DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
17. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 21. System 1 and System 2 are not actual systems that exist
within our brains. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 51. Rather, psychologists employ
these terms as “label[s] for collections of processes that are distinguished by their speed,
controllability, and the contents on which they operate.” Id. Intriguingly, however, there is
some neuroscience evidence that System 1 and System 2 thinking utilize different areas of the
brain. Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, In Two Minds: Dual-Process Accounts of Reasoning, 7 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 454, 456 (2003).
18. LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187–96 (1991); Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Temporal Differences in Trait SelfAscription: When the Self Is Seen as an Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (2006);
Emily Pronin, Daniel Y. Lin & Lee Ross, The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others,
28 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 369 (2002); Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus
Assumed Differences in Construal: “Naive Realism” in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404, 414–15 (1995).
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unconscious processes of System 1 are often the primary source of our
conscious impressions, beliefs, feelings, intuitions, and choices.19 System 1
processes operate almost instantaneously, guiding and influencing our
judgments and behaviors much more than we are consciously aware.20
Many of the characteristics of System 1 are crucial to our survival. As
psychologists note, our ability to function in the world would be greatly
reduced without mental shortcuts that process information quickly and
without conscious effort.21 In plain language, if an individual had to exert
effort to remember the way to work every day, there would be no mental
energy left to do any work by the time the individual arrived. Furthermore,
System 1 features facilitate our ability to act quickly—without the need for
conscious thought—when confronted with an unexpected emergency. For
instance, if an armed individual were rapidly approaching, it would be
essential to determine whether the individual poses a threat. System 1 can
provide a “gut” response to the “friend or foe” question.
Luckily for most of us, System 1 often gets things right. Our intuitions,
instincts, and gut reactions are frequently accurate, and using non-conscious
processes to achieve that accuracy saves us valuable cognitive resources.22 As
a result, our minds are freed from the tedium of smaller considerations
(e.g., what route must I take to get home again?) to ponder more important
considerations (e.g., what do I want for dinner?).
The biggest problem with System 1 thinking is that, despite being able
to reach decisions quickly and conserve cognitive resources,23 it is prone to
systematic errors (i.e., biases). As an example, think of the first word that
comes to mind in response to the following questions:
What type of music did Peter, Paul & Mary play?
Folk.
What does a comedian tell that makes people laugh?
A joke.
What is a wire in the middle of a bicycle?
A spoke.
What billows out of the top of a campfire?
Smoke.
What sound does a frog make?

19. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 18.
20. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 13, 20, 29; Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their
Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 15 (1989); Anthony
G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in
Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464,
1477 (1998).
21. See David H. Ebenbach & Dacher Keltner, Power, Emotion, and Judgmental Accuracy in
Social Conflict: Motivating the Cognitive Miser, 20 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 7, 7 (1998).
22. Tversky & Kahnemen, supra note 7, at 1124.
23. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 51, 70.
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Croak.
What is the white part of an egg?
Well . . . it is the white part of an egg. An egg white.24 If, in your mind,
you said “yolk,” however, you are not alone. System 1 processed a set of
answers that fit a pattern—words that rhyme with “folk”—and provided an
answer that was associated with “part of an egg” that fit that pattern: “yolk.”
So, while System 1 likely helped you to figure out what sound a frog makes
without thinking too hard, it hindered your attempt to identify the white
part of an egg (even if you got the answer right). The reason is that System 1
uses so-called associative activation networks to do a lot of the work for it.25
Hence, associative activation networks are one explanation for why System 1
is prone to systematic errors.
A second source of error is that many of the mental processes System 1
performs are beyond our ability to volitionally control.26 For instance,
people cannot stop themselves from comprehending sentences in their own
language assuming, of course, that the sentences are not gobbledygook.27
Thus, while System 1 is efficient, skilled, and often accurate, the inability to
suppress its operations can lead to systematic and predictable errors of
judgment.
The final source of System 1 errors stems from the fact that we will
often adopt the intuitions of System 1 unquestioningly, unless something
activates System 2. One situation in which the deliberate and slow-thinking
System 2 will override System 1 is if we encounter an individual (or an
object) that is surprising or does not conform to our expectations. System 2
will be mobilized in an attempt to resolve the disparity.28 For instance,
System 2 would take over if you saw a pregnant man29 or a barking cat.30
Attempting to reconcile the event with your understanding of the world by
becoming consciously engaged and analytical is a System 2 mental process.31
However, this process will never be engaged when you are not consciously
aware of any uncertainty.

24. Of course, the egg white is also known as the albumen.
25. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 51. “Associative activation networks” are also referred to as
spreading activation, associative networks, and other names. See, e.g., John R. Anderson, A
Spreading Activation Theory of Memory, 22 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 261 (1983);
Allan M. Collins & Elizabeth F. Loftus, A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing, 82
PSYCHOL. REV. 407 (1975); Elliot R. Smith, Mental Representation and Memory, in THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 391, 391–445 (Daniel Gilbert, Susan Fiske & Lindsay Gardner eds., 4th
ed. 1998).
26. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 25.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 24, 25.
29. Id. at 74.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 60, 80; see also Evans, supra note 17, at 454.
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Errors in System 1 reasoning are difficult to eliminate or even
recognize. We take them as natural, and often treat them as correct unless
they are scrutinized later. Many would say that this is the benefit of System
2—the self-reflective and deliberative process the mind uses for more
difficult, less-rehearsed problems. When an unexpected piece of
information causes a disruption in System 1 thinking (e.g., the word “yolk”
does not sound right after you say it), System 2 processes take control to
deduce the correct answer.32 “System 1 provides snap judgments and offers a
form of rough-and-ready, bias-prone thinking that leans heavily on factual
context and previously held beliefs. System 2 kicks in after a time delay and
corrects errors . . . .”33
Understood in this way, System 1 and System 2 processes provide a
nearly ideal model of mental functioning. All things being equal, we rely on
our intuitions, which saves us valuable cognitive resources. However, when
confronted with a novel or surprising situation, we have the capacity to
engage in more effortful processing. Unfortunately, there are often
occasions when we rely on System 1 when System 2 would produce more
accurate assessments, and vice versa. In other words, no matter how often
our minds get it right, there are times when we should not trust ourselves to
produce objective and accurate assessments of the world around us.
Of particular concern in this Essay are the errors we tend to make in the
realm of race and suspicion. In the social-cognitive tradition of Kahneman
and Tversky,34 psychologists have exploited System 1’s use of automatic
associative activation networks to explore the ways in which our minds
perceive race. These networks provide a pathway towards a particular kind of
System 1 error: implicit racial bias. For the most part, the research studying
these implicit racial biases has developed separately from the research we
just discussed on heuristics and biases in general. We discuss the research on
implicit racial biases next.
B. IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
We can think of implicit biases as System 1 mental shortcuts that help us
make meaning of persons and/or social groups.35 Put another way, implicit
biases are the automatic associations connected with a social group. For
instance, one might associate “elderly” with “wise,” “women” with
“nurturing,” and “lawyers” with “expensive.” Possessing automatic
associations is not, in and of itself, problematic. However, a significant body
32. Importantly, System 2 does not always get it right, either. Kahneman & Frederick,
supra note 13, at 52.
33. Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WISC. L. REV. 759, 796 n.124 (2007).
34. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7.
35. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005) (describing a
similar framework that he terms “racial mechanics”).
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of literature now demonstrates that these automatic associations can
influence perceptions and subsequent behaviors.36 Consequently, the
automatic association of “Blacks” with “criminal,” for instance, may cause
someone to interpret ambiguous behavior by a black target as more criminal
than identical behavior by a white target. Much like “folk” calls to mind
things that rhyme with it, and can lead a reader to substitute “yolk” for “egg
whites,” “Black” calls to mind stereotypes associated with it, and can lead an
observer to perceive behaviors in line with those stereotypes.
Importantly, these racially biased judgments do not require traditional
bigotry. Rather, for individuals who associate “Black” with “criminal”
unconsciously in their minds, it is possible that the mere mention of the
category “Black” can activate the trait “criminal,” causing them to interpret
behaviors in line with the activated concept—even if they are committed
anti-racists and even if they are Black themselves. This is, again, because of
associative activation networks.37
In the field of psychology, ideas can be thought of as “nodes in a vast
network, called associative memory, in which each idea is linked to many
others.”38 Associative activation is not a linear process, with each idea only
being linked to one other idea. Rather, one idea activates many different
ideas all at once, and these activated ideas, then, activate others.39 The
majority of this activity occurs outside of conscious awareness.40
What causes the mind to link ideas of circumstances, events, and
actions, among others, is that these ideas regularly occur at the same time or
within a relatively short interval.41 Because of this co-occurrence, the mind
learns to associate these ideas.42 Once these links or associations are made,
they are kept in memory and accessed unintentionally and without effort the
next time any of these ideas are activated.43
Once associations are linked and strengthened through practice, this
pattern of associated ideas constructs a mental model for what is normal or
typical.44 Objects are associated with their properties, and people are
associated with their groups.45 Once these models are built, people’s
36. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2035, 2043–56 (2011) (citing sources).
37. Devine, supra note 20, at 6–7, 15–16.
38. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 52.
39. Id. at 51–52.
40. Id. at 52; John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999); Devine, supra note 20, at 6.
41. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 468.
42. Id. at 468–70.
43. Id.
44. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 72, 74, 168; Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 467–68;
Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6.
45. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 52; Marilynn B. Brewer, A Dual Process Model of Impression
Formation, in ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1 (Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr. eds.,
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memories hold an image of prototypical members of these categories.46 And
when the “groups” are people, and the “categories” are races, our minds
tend to use stereotypes as a kind of mental shorthand for group categories—
saving us time, but often applying traits to individuals that are neither
accurate nor fair.47
Jennifer Eberhardt and one of the authors of this Essay recently
published work designed to investigate this automatic association between
racial groups and the stereotypes attached to them.48 Specifically, in a series
of studies, these psychologists investigated whether the automatic association
of Blacks with crime also influenced what individuals saw and how they
directed their attention.49 In one study, participants were brought into the
lab and subliminally primed (i.e., shown pictures so quickly on a computer
screen that participants were unaware they had seen anything) with pictures
of black or white male faces.50 Participants then watched a series of movies
that displayed images progressing from “snow” on an old television to a clear
picture of an object.51 Participants were instructed to press a button when
they were able to identify the object.52 They saw two kinds of objects: crimerelated objects (e.g., guns, badges, fingerprints, etc.) and crime-unrelated
objects (e.g., staplers, tea cups, keys, etc.).53
Reaction-time analyses demonstrated that when participants had been
exposed to white male faces, they found both crime-related and crimeunrelated objects equally fast.54 However, when participants had been
exposed to black male faces, they saw crime-related objects faster than crimeunrelated objects.55 In this case, the mere presence of Blackness made it
easier to see crime than when Blackness was absent.
In a parallel study, participants were brought into the lab and
subliminally exposed to words related to crime (e.g., arrest, felony, etc.) or
nonsense letter strings (e.g., xvslpe).56 They were then presented with a

1988); Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6; Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of
Impression Formation from Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and
Motivation on Attention and Interpretation, 23 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1
(1990).
46. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 168; Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years
Later, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 16, at 232–34.
47. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 466–67; Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6;
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65.
48. See generally Eberhardt et al., supra note 8; Goff et al., supra note 9.
49. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 8.
50. Id. at 880.
51. Id. at 879.
52. Id. at 878.
53. Id. at 878–79.
54. Id. at 880–81.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 885–88.
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black male and white male face, equidistant from the mid-point of the
screen.57 After a few seconds, these faces disappeared and a faint dot
appeared where one of the two faces had been.58 Participants were told to
indicate whether the dot appeared on the left- or right-hand side of the
screen.59
In this research paradigm, a participant’s reaction time was a proxy for
their attentional bias. That is, if they were faster to indicate where the dot
was when it appeared behind the white face as opposed to the black face,
then they were likely looking more closely at the white face, and vice versa.
The research demonstrated that when participants (who were mostly White)
saw nonsense words, they tended to stare at the white face more than the
black face—a kind of “in-group” bias.60 However, when participants were
first exposed to words related to crime, they were far faster to find the dot
behind the black face than the white face.61 In other words, thinking of
crime made participants look towards black faces.
These two studies provide evidence of a reciprocal relationship between
race and crime. That is, as “Black” activates thoughts of criminality, so too
does criminality activate thoughts of Blackness, each strengthening the
association between the two.
Again, while conscious effort can mobilize System 2, allowing us to
perceive individuals more deliberately, there are a host of contexts that
make this more difficult.62 For instance, when individuals are cognitively
depleted—say, they are tired after a long drive—they are more likely to rely
on automatic processes (e.g., stereotypes) regardless of how dedicated they
may be to non-racist values.63 Similarly, if one is distracted,64 anxious,65 or

57. Importantly, these faces were pre-tested to be equally attractive and equally
stereotypical of their respective races. Id. at 886.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 887.
61. Id.
62. Brewer, supra note 45, at 1–36; Devine, supra note 20, at 15–16; Fiske et al., supra note
46, at 236; Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 510 (1991).
63. Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Circadian
Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319, 319 (1990); Devine, supra note 20, at 16; C.
Neil Macrae, Galen V. Bodenhausen & Alan B. Milne, Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus
and the Regulation of Mental Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 587 (1998); Mark
Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control
Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247, 247–48 (2000); William von Hippel, Lisa A. Silver
& Molly E. Lynch, Stereotyping Against Your Will: The Role of Inhibitory Ability in Stereotyping and
Prejudice Among the Elderly, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 523, 523–24, 530 (2000).
64. See Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 62, at 512.
65. Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, Negotiating Interracial Interactions: Costs,
Consequences, and Possibilities, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 316, 318 (2007).
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just feeling badly about one’s self,66 one is more likely to rely on automatic
associations, thus increasing reliance on stereotypes. Perhaps most
distressing in the case of stereotypes regarding race and crime is that simply
engaging in cross-race interactions can be sufficiently anxiety-provoking—
particularly among well-meaning individuals—to prevent them from using
System 2 processes.67 Consequently, though our minds come equipped with
the capacity to interrogate our thoughts, they can fail to function optimally
where issues of identity and stereotypes are concerned.
Obviously, this is relevant to issues of determining guilt and
“dangerousness,” as perceptions of even law enforcement professionals can
be influenced by these implicit biases. However, these biases can influence
more than just perceptions—they can directly influence behaviors as well.
When implicit associations influence behavior beneath awareness (i.e.,
behaviors that happen either too quickly to be controlled, or behaviors
motivated by unconscious processes), this is called an ideomotor effect, to
which we will now turn our attentions.
When criminal stereotypes are activated, they can result in people
acting more aggressively than they might otherwise. This ideomotor effect
often occurs without any conscious awareness that one is behaving in this
way. For instance, in one study demonstrating this effect, researchers had
subjects complete an extremely long and tedious computer task consisting of
130 trials.68 Before each one, the participants were primed below the level of
conscious awareness with photos depicting the face of either a black or white
individual.
Researchers rigged the computers so that, on the last trial, the
computer program would crash and the subjects would be told to begin the
entire task again.69 Their reactions to this news were videotaped and later
coded for hostility. The results demonstrated that those primed with
pictures of black faces reacted with more hostility to the news, regardless of
their racial attitudes.70 The researchers concluded that the prime activated
associations linked to aggression, which then tipped the balance in favor of a
more aggressive response to the unwelcome news.71

66. Steven Fein & Steven J. Spencer, Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming the Self
Through Derogating Others, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31, 31 (1997).
67. Phillip Atiba Goff, Claude M. Steele & Paul G. Davies, The Space Between Us: Stereotype
Threat and Distance in Interracial Contexts, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 91 (2008);
Richeson & Shelton, supra note 65, at 318; Jacquie D. Vorauer, Kelley J. Main & Gordon B.
O’Connell, How Do Individuals Expect To Be Viewed by Members of Lower Status Groups? Content and
Implications of Meta-stereotypes, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 933–34 (1998).
68. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and
Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238 (1996).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 238–39.
71. Id. at 239.
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Ideomotor effects generated by racial stereotypes are also implicated in
the work of several researchers who study reactions to simulated shooter
tasks.72 In one study, researchers asked both civilians and officers to shoot
armed individuals and to refrain from shooting unarmed individuals using
buttons labeled “shoot” and “don’t shoot.”73 This design permitted
researchers to test two alternative forms of bias. On the one hand,
individuals might accidentally shoot more unarmed black than unarmed
white suspects. On the other hand, individuals could simply be faster to
shoot armed black than armed white suspects.
Results of this research revealed that both civilians and officers
demonstrated a similar degree of racial bias when it came to the speed of
their decision-making. That is, both shot armed black suspects faster than
armed white suspects.74 However, unlike civilians, who also shot more
unarmed black than unarmed white suspects, officers were able to inhibit a
racial bias in favor of shooting undeserving black targets—evidence that
training can reduce automatic racial biases in some cases.
However, in other research conducted by one of the authors of this
Essay, training was not as helpful. In a study on the role of implicit
dehumanization—the automatic association between Blacks and apes—
researchers found that the degree to which officers associated Blacks with
apes predicted both the degree to which they misperceived black children as
adults and justified violence against them.75 In this study, officers were
brought into a laboratory and took an implicit association test,76 a test of
how strongly an individual associates two concepts—in this case, Blacks and
apes. Afterwards, they were shown a photo array of black, white, and latino
juveniles who were suspected of various crimes. Officers were asked to guess
how old each juvenile was. This research revealed that not only did officers
perceive black children as significantly older than they actually were, but an
officer’s implicit association of Blacks with apes was a significant predictor of
that over-estimation.77 In other words, the more officers implicitly associated
Blacks with apes, the more likely they were to see a black child as a black
adult. However, the officers’ implicit associations did not affect perceptions
of the age of either latino or white youths.78

72. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity To Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1317–18 (2002).
73. Id. at 1316; see also B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended
Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 288 (2006) (noting that split-second
decisions limit individual ability to control for racial bias caused by racial stereotypes).
74. Correll et al., supra note 9, at 1020.
75. Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing
Black Children (Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
76. Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65.
77. Goff et al., supra note 75, at 46–47.
78. Id. at 22–23.
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After completing the study, the research team was granted access to
each officer’s use-of-force history with juveniles. These data led to the most
disturbing finding of all—that an officer’s implicit association between
Blacks and apes led to higher rates of racial disparity in the use of force
against black juveniles. That is, the more an officer associated Blacks with
apes, the more they used force against black (but not white or latino)
suspects.79
These data suggest that implicit bias can sometimes prove resistant to
the gentling effects of introspection (i.e., System 2). Though using
guidelines, such as “stop and think” or “use a checklist,” to safeguard against
predictable System 1 errors does tend to reduce those errors,80 and
encouraging introspection also curbs important and predictable System 1
biases,81 that should not be taken as evidence that the “silver bullet” for
fixing these errors is simply slowing down. Rather, we suggest that “stopping
and thinking” is merely one tool in the arsenal that we can use to reduce
systematic errors caused by fast-thinking and intuitive mental processes.
C. THE CONSTRUCT
The suspicion heuristic is a construct that relies upon the mind science
of heuristics and biases on the one hand,82 and implicit racial associations
on the other,83 to explain how merely perceiving race—even absent racial
animus—can influence judgments of criminality beyond conscious
awareness. Before developing the suspicion heuristic, we will first discuss the
mental shortcuts people use when called upon to make difficult assessments
in general. Then, we will apply these lessons to situations in which people
are asked to make judgments in the context of suspicion.
1. In General
As previously mentioned, individuals typically resort to heuristics when
faced with a difficult judgment.84 Because the judgment is complex, System
1 substitutes an easier, but related, assessment instead.85 Substitution of
easier questions occurs non-consciously. And, because the answer to the

79. Id. at 23–27.
80. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 12, at 15; see also Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7,
at 1124–31.
81. See Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the Development and
Operation of Cues for Control, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1032, 1038–39 (2002).
82. See supra Part I.A.
83. See supra Part I.B.
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Kahneman & Frederick, supra note
13, at 53.
85. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163–64 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see also Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 53.
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heuristic question comes to mind quickly and easily, people are unaware
that they answered a question that was not asked. Indeed, people likely will
not even realize that the initial judgment was difficult because an intuitive
answer readily came to mind.86
In their work, Tversky and Kahneman discovered that the use of
heuristics is common when individuals make assessments of probability.87
They found that both lay people and statistical experts often rest these
judgments on their intuitions rather than on the laws of probability.88 For
instance, consideration of base rates (the pervasiveness of an item or
phenomenon in the world) is important when determining the likelihood of
uncertain events.89 But, instead of considering base rates, people asked to
assess the likelihood of uncertain events may substitute a judgment of
similarity instead.90 For example, when asked to judge the likelihood that a
certain person is a lawyer, people may rest their predictions on how similar
the person is to their stereotype of lawyers.91 This substitution of the
similarity or protypicality question for the probability question is known as
the representativeness heuristic.92 The representativeness heuristic can cause
significant errors because people fail to account for factors that should
influence their probability judgments.93
Another heuristic that can affect probability judgments is known as the
availability heuristic.94 When people utilize the availability heuristic, their
judgments of probability are influenced by how easily and quickly similar
instances to the one at issue come to mind (i.e., how “available” or salient a
86. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 99. Kahneman gives some examples of substitution. If you
are asked, “How happy are you with your life these days?” The question you will likely answer
instead is, “What is my mood right now.” Id. at 98. If asked, “How popular will the president be
six months from now?” The easier question you will answer instead is, “How popular is the
president right now?” Id. at 98.
87. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1124.
88. For an extended discussion, see id. at 1130.
89. Id. at 1124–25. Another factor people may fail to consider is predictability, which
refers to the degree to which accurate predictions are possible. Id. at 1126.
90. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness,
3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 432–33 (1972).
91. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 451 (“The likelihood that a particular 12-yearold boy will become a scientist, for example, may be evaluated by the degree to which the role
of a scientist is representative of our image of the boy.”); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at
1124 (“In the representative heuristic, the probability that [a certain person] is a librarian, for
example, is assessed by the degree to which he is representative of, or similar to, the stereotype
of a librarian.”).
92. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 90, at 433. For an extended discussion of
representativeness, see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at
84.
93. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 49–51.
94. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7, at 1127.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2164797

E1_RICHARDSON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/1/2012 12:00 PM

SELF-DEFENSE AND THE SUSPICION HEURISTIC

309

prior event is).95 For example, people’s judgments of the probability that
they will be involved in a serious car accident may be affected by how
recently they witnessed or read about an automobile fatality. Substitution of
availability for probability can also result in serious errors because, again,
people using the availability heuristic ignore the laws of chance.
People likely utilize the availability heuristic in social situations because
they often do not have “complete, reliable, [and] predictive information”
about the individuals they encounter.96 The availability heuristic, then, helps
people to make judgments and predictions about others when full
information is absent.97 However, because people’s pre-existing “beliefs and
values foster preconceptions that heighten the availability of certain
evidence,” the availability heuristic can lead to errors in judgment.98
An example can help one distinguish between availability and
representativeness:
[W]hen asked to evaluate the relative frequency of cocaine use in
Hollywood actors, one may assess how easy it is to retrieve examples
of celebrity drug-users—the availability heuristic piggybacks on
highly efficient memory retrieval processes. When evaluating the
likelihood that a given comic actor is a cocaine user, one may assess
the similarity between that actor and the prototypical cocaine user
(the representativeness heuristic piggybacks on automatic patternmatching processes).99
People are generally unaware that they have substituted representativeness
and availability judgments for probability judgments because System 1
makes these heuristic substitutions quickly and automatically.100
Furthermore, the use of heuristics and the errors associated with them occur
even when individuals are asked to be as accurate as possible or are given
rewards for correct answers.101
2. Judgments of Criminality
Like other probability judgments, predicting the likelihood that a
person is dangerous is extremely difficult—especially when the other is a
95. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973). As Tversky and Kahneman wrote, “A person
is said to employ the availability heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the
ease with which instances or associations could be brought to mind.” Id. at 208.
96. Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 85, at 190–91.
97. Id. at 191.
98. Id. at 191–92.
99. Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 3.
100. KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 159.
101. Id.
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stranger. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that people do not have
the luxury of time to gather as much information as possible about the
person being assessed and to engage in the deliberate, systematic processing
of the evidence since hesitating may create a risk of injury or death. Faced
with a potentially life-threatening situation, people are unlikely to take the
time necessary for deductive reasoning. Rather, they will make their
judgments of criminality quickly, based upon only small slices of behavior,
under highly stressful circumstances. In this context, it would not be
surprising if people made their assessments of criminality using the
representativeness and availability heuristics. This substitution of
representativeness and availability in the context of judgments of criminality
(we use the phrase “judgments of criminality” to refer to the assessment that
another is engaged in criminal activity or poses a threat) is what we term the
“suspicion heuristic.”
Use of the suspicion heuristic cannot help but disadvantage Blacks. This
is because Blacks serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype) for the
violent street criminal.102 Furthermore, the tendency for black suspects to be
over-represented in media portrayals of violent street crime103 makes the
Black-as-criminal stereotype readily available.
However, heuristic errors in determinations of suspicion can also
burden other groups stereotyped as criminal in certain situations because
what triggers the suspicion heuristic is the existence of the stereotype. For
instance, Latinos (or those appearing to be) are stereotyped as drug dealers,
gang members, and undocumented immigrants;104 people believed to be

102. Correll et al., supra note 72, at 1314–15; Danny Osborne, Perceived Stereotypicality
and Eyewitness Memory: Does the Type of Crime Affect Eyewitness Identifications? 62–63 (May
27, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles) (on file with
authors); see also Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1139–44 (1995); Birt L.
Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of
Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 591 (1976); Jennifer L. Eberhardt
et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876
(2004) (“The stereotype of Black Americans as violent and criminal has been documented by
social psychologists for almost 60 years.”); Sophie Trawalter et al., Attending to Threat: Race-Based
Patterns of Selective Attention, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1322, 1322 (2008) (“There is
overwhelming evidence that young Black men are stereotyped as violent, criminal, and
dangerous . . . both implicitly as well as explicitly.”) (citations omitted).
103. See Gregg Hoffmann, Racial Stereotyping in the News: Some General Semantics Alternatives,
48 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 22, 23 (1991), available at http://www.generalsemantics.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/05/articles/etc/ 48-1-hoffmann.pdf; Kang, supra note 35, at 1556–57
(noting that media violent crime stories can exacerbate implicit biases). See generally Travis L.
Dixon & Cristina L. Azocar, Priming Crime and Activating Blackness: Understanding the Psychological
Impact of the Overrepresentation of Blacks as Lawbreakers on Television News, 57 J. COMM. 229, 229
(2007); Travis L. Dixon & Daniel Linz, Race and the Misrepresentation of Victimization on Local
Television News, 27 COMM. RES. 547, 548 (2000).
104. Lee, supra note 3, at 441–44.
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Muslim are stereotyped as terrorists;105 and Whites are stereotyped as drug
buyers when they are in nonwhite neighborhoods.106
Although it is easy and familiar to resort to conscious racial bias to
explain racial errors in judgments of criminality, the suspicion heuristic can
explain how these mistakes occur even in the absence of a consciously biased
actor. Imagine egalitarian-minded individuals walking down a dark street at
night. It would not be surprising for them to think about the possibility of
being mugged or attacked. Although they are not aware of it, simply
thinking about crime may automatically trigger the link between non-Whites
and criminality below the level of conscious awareness.107 As a result, their
attention is more likely to be drawn to non-Whites present in the
environment—a type of unconscious racial profiling.108 Notice, then, that
even before individuals make a judgment of criminality, they may subject
non-Whites to greater scrutiny. This can occur regardless of whether
individuals intend it.109
Once their attention is captured, they will make a judgment about the
likelihood that the stranger is engaged in criminal activity. However, they
may substitute a judgment of how closely this person resembles a criminal
stereotype instead. Hence, if the person being judged is non-White,
individuals are more likely to make a mistaken judgment of criminality.
The suspicion heuristic can bias individuals’ judgments even if they
consciously reject the stereotype. The decisions of the best-intentioned
individuals may be affected by the mere existence of the stereotype because
of the associative networks our minds use to process information. That is,
merely being aware of the stereotype is sufficient to be influenced by it in
ways that disadvantage those stereotyped as criminal, regardless of the
perceiver’s intentions or character. Even worse, people’s heuristiccriminality judgment will feel easy, familiar, and true because they cannot
evaluate information processes that proceed beneath awareness.
Importantly, we do not dispute the existence of bad actors. Yet, the
precipitous decline in explicit racial bias over the past quarter century110
suggests that errors in judgments of criminality that disproportionately affect
105. Holning Lau, Identity Scripts & Democratic Deliberation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 897, 922–23,
969–70 (2010).
106. I. Bennett Capers, Developments in the Law—Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 43, 68–69 (2009); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1472, 1517 (1988).
107. See Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 876 passim.
108. See id. (discussing attentional bias).
109. See id.
110. Lawrence Bobo, Whites’ Opposition to Busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?,
45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1196, 1196 (1983); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 834 (2001); Goff, Steele & Davies,
supra note 67, at 91; see, e.g., Philip Perlmutter, The Decline of Bigotry in America, 46 SOC. 517
(2009).
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non-Whites may resist explanations that reduce to “people are racist.” The
suspicion heuristic, in contrast, provides an equally compelling explanation
for these patterns without relying on a theory of dwindling racial bigotry.
The suspicion heuristic provides a more nuanced explanation for the racial
disparities that continue to plague judgments of criminality—and does so
without the preoccupation with bigotry that obscures the pervasive problem
of non-conscious bias. The explanation is one that does not rely upon the
fiction of the objective decision-maker or the scapegoat of the consciously
biased actor. The suspicion heuristic can account for the reproduction of
disparities of all types, even in the absence of culpable motives on the part of
the decision-maker.
No doubt this explanation is more troubling than one that relies upon
the bad-actor model because it means that even well-intentioned people can
make these erroneous judgments. Nevertheless, the suspicion heuristic
framework is consistent with over four decades of research into how humans
think, process information, and make judgments. Thus, we should contend
with its effects on judgments of criminality rather than remaining mired in
antiqued lay theories of human nature.111
Now, one might imagine that if people encounter individuals who do
not fit the criminal stereotype more often than individuals who do, this will
affect the availability heuristic. However, this conclusion is based on the
assumption that our memories are pristine—an assumption that finds
contradictory evidence in literature on memory generally, and implicit
biases in particular. This research provides evidence that people are more
likely to remember events that are consistent with their pre-existing beliefs
and expectations.112 Given the social construction of crime as racially
Black,113 people are more likely to both consciously and non-consciously
associate Blacks with criminality. What this means is that people are more
likely to recall evidence of Black criminality than instances when that
stereotype was proven false.
Worse still, the representativeness heuristic may bias individuals in favor
of remembering more stereotypical members of a group (e.g., dark-skinned
Blacks) as suspects—even when they were not.114 For instance, in work
conducted by Eberhardt and one of this Essay’s authors, police officers
111. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1062 (2006).
112. Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance
of Social Stereotypes, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 344 (1979); see also ZIVA KUNDA,
SOCIAL COGNITION 130 (1999) (“Much of what we ‘learn’ from experience may reflect our
prior theories about reality rather than the actual nature of reality.”); Claudia E. Cohen, Person
Categories and Social Perception: Testing Some Boundaries of the Processing Effects of Prior Knowledge, 40
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 441, 441 (1981) (describing a study in which subjects were
more likely to remember stereotype-consistent information).
113. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
114. Eberhardt et al., supra note 8, at 888–89.
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reliably remembered a more racially stereotypically black suspect and a less
racially stereotypical white suspect as having committed a crime.115 Officers
in this study were presented with the picture of an alleged criminal, and
read about the crime he committed. Half of the officers saw a white criminal
and the other half a black criminal. After a brief period, officers were given a
surprise recall task and asked to pick the suspect out of a lineup. The lineup
consisted of five faces, each pre-tested as equally attractive, but varying in
racial stereotypicality. Two of the faces were more racially stereotypical than
the target suspect, and two were less racially stereotypical. The results
confirmed that, though officer recall was generally high (that is, they usually
picked the right suspect), to the degree that they “got it wrong” and
misidentified the suspect, they tended to pick out more racially stereotypical
black suspects and less racially stereotypical white suspects.
Imagine, then, that two men—one obviously Black, the other racially
ambiguous—are seen running from a convenience store after a robbery.
Both are wearing stereotypically “black” clothes (e.g., sagged jeans, an
oversized white t-shirt, and a sports jersey). Not only is an officer arriving to
the scene likely to pay more attention to the unambiguously black suspect,116
but that officer is also likely to remember that black suspect as the person of
greatest interest after the fact—regardless of whether or not he was the
culprit.
The suspicion heuristic gives us a basis for believing that non-Whites will
be judged as criminal more often, regardless of whether they are actually
engaged in criminal activity. This judgment will be consistent with System 1’s
default intuitive position where non-Whites are concerned. For those not
stereotyped as criminal, it will take more unambiguous evidence of
criminality before that judgment will be made.117 Stated another way, linking
non-Whites with criminality is cognitively easy, while linking Whites with
criminality is cognitively more taxing.118
In sum, the suspicion heuristic posits that, when attempting to predict
the likelihood that a person poses a threat, individuals may rely upon the
availability and representativeness heuristics to make that determination.
Because an intuitive answer to these much easier questions comes to mind
quickly, most individuals will not even be aware of the substitution. In these
cases, System 1 heuristic errors combine with implicit racial associations to
help the perceiver make a decision about ambiguous actors or behaviors.
And, these quick, non-conscious processes also determine split-second
decisions about behaviors (e.g., to shout “halt,” call for backup, or discharge
115. Id. at 886–88.
116. Id.
117. See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of
Motivations To Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835 (2002).
118. Of course, this general statement has exceptions. For instance, it is likely cognitively
easier to link Whites with white-collar crimes than non-Whites.
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a weapon). Furthermore, the suspicion heuristic explains how mere
knowledge of ubiquitous criminal stereotypes can cause pernicious errors in
judgment and perception, regardless of whether the individuals involved
believe or subscribe to the stereotype.
Considering the implications of the suspicion heuristic on judgments of
criminality provides important insights into the law of self-defense—one
doctrine that relies upon the reasonableness of these criminality judgments.
The doctrine rests in large part upon judging whether an actor’s belief that
s/he faces an imminent threat of unlawful force is reasonable.119 In Part II,
we consider the implications of the suspicion heuristic for the doctrine of
self-defense. The intent of this Essay is to begin thinking about how the
suspicion heuristic should influence thinking about that doctrine and to
trace the broad outlines of a new approach.
II. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE SUSPICION HEURISTIC
The typical self-defense statute allows non-aggressors to use deadly force
to protect themselves from the imminent use of deadly and unlawful force
by another.120 A majority of jurisdictions require that a person’s belief
regarding the necessity of using force be both honest and reasonable.121
Stated differently, the defense is recognized even if a person uses deadly
force against an innocent victim, as long as the individual actually believed
deadly force was necessary and the mistake was reasonable.
The suspicion heuristic demonstrates how easily honest—but
mistaken—beliefs can occur when the person being judged fits a criminal
stereotype. That is because an individual deciding whether or not selfdefensive actions are necessary must make a quick judgment of criminality
(i.e., an intuitive assessment about whether the use of deadly force against
her/him is imminent). This is precisely the situation likely to trigger the
suspicion heuristic. In other words, the actor may well substitute
representativeness and availability questions for the probability-of-criminality
question. When the person being judged fits a criminal stereotype, the
suspicion heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but
mistakenly—that the person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary

119. See infra Part II.A.
120. See People v. Brown, 952 N.E.2d 32, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The Model Penal Code
does not require imminence. Rather, it requires that the use of force be “immediately
necessary.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (2012).
121. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 225 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING]; John F. Wagner Jr., Standard for Determination of Reasonableness of
Criminal Defendant’s Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense Claim, that Physical Force Is Necessary—Modern
Cases, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993, 996 (1989). Only four jurisdictions utilize a purely subjective test.
Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010).
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and appropriate to repel it. These erroneous judgments can occur
regardless of the actor’s conscious racial attitudes and beliefs.
Consider, as an example, the tragic shooting death of Yoshihiro Hattori.
Hattori was a sixteen-year-old Japanese exchange student living with a white
family in Louisiana.122 One night in October, he and Webb Haymaker, a
member of his host family, were on their way to a Halloween party.123
Hattori was dressed as John Travolta (à la Saturday Night Fever), wearing a
white tuxedo jacket and carrying a small black camera.124 Haymaker was
dressed as a car-accident victim.125
The two got lost and mistook the home of Rodney and Bonnie Peairs as
the location of the party.126 They rang the doorbell, but when no one
answered, the boys walked around to the carport.127 At that moment, Mrs.
Peairs opened the door.128 She saw Haymaker first, but when Hattori
rounded the corner, she screamed, slammed the door shut, and yelled out
to her husband to “[g]et the gun.”129
The boys began to walk away, still in search of the Halloween party.130
They were on the sidewalk, approximately ten yards away from the home,131
when Mr. Peairs ran outside with his laser-scoped .44 Smith & Wesson
Magnum.132 Hattori, who spoke broken English, turned around and began
to walk back towards Mr. Peairs, saying that they were there for the party.133
Mr. Peairs yelled “Freeze!” but Hattori did not understand what that word
meant.134 When Hattori continued to approach, Mr. Peairs fired one shot,
killing Hattori.135 The entire event, from the time Mr. Peairs opened his
door, lasted about three seconds.136 A jury found Mr. Peairs’s belief that he
was in imminent danger reasonable and acquitted him.137
People can speculate about whether racism played a role in Hattori’s
tragic and needless death. But while it is tempting to fixate on the spectacle
of Mr. Peairs’s potentially racist intentions, the operation of the suspicion
heuristic suggests that using race as a proxy for suspicion is not unusual or
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Hattori v. Peairs, 662 So. 2d 509, 511–13 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 511.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 511–12.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 512.
Id.
Id.
LEE, supra note 2, at 167.
Hattori, 662 So. 2d at 512.
LEE, supra note 2, at 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unexpected, and can happen both consciously and non-consciously. Even if
Mr. Peairs was a well-intentioned man, under time pressure, the suspicion
heuristic could cause him to see Hattori’s camera as a gun and to interpret
Hattori’s failure to stop as evidence of aggression.
The suspicion heuristic can also provide insights into the shooting
death of Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year-old black teen.138 Based upon the
undisputed evidence, Martin was on his way back to the home of his father’s
fiancée on the evening of February 26th after purchasing items at a
convenience store.139 He was unarmed, carrying Skittles and an iced tea.140
George Zimmerman, a Neighborhood Watch volunteer, spotted him and
became immediately suspicious.141
Zimmerman called the local police department and reported seeing “a
real suspicious guy.”142 He indicated that the individual was “just walking
around looking about” and “looks like he’s up to no good or he’s on drugs
or something.”143 Zimmerman then reported that the individual was staring
and coming towards him.144 Next, he described the individual running
“down toward the other entrance of the neighborhood.”145 At this point, the
dispatcher asked Zimmerman if he was in pursuit and Zimmerman
responded that he was.146 The dispatcher replied, “We don’t need you to do
that,” to which Zimmerman answered, “OK.”147 There is some dispute about

138. Karen McVeigh, Trayvon Martin’s Death: The Story So Far, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2012,
5:53 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/20/trayvon-martin-death-story-so-far.
139. Amy Goodman & Denis Moynihan, Walking While Black: The Killing of Trayvon Martin,
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.democracynow.org/blog/2012/3/22/
walking_while_black_the_killing_of_trayvon_martin; Matt Gutman & Seni Tienabeso, Trayvon
Martin’s Last Phone Call Triggers Demand for Arrest, ABC NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-arrest-now-abc-reveals-crucial-phone/story?id=
15959017#.UEJqcUI8F-U.
140. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, The Curious Case of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/opinion/blow-the-curious-case-of-trayvon-martin.
html.
141. Rene Stutzman, Police: Zimmerman Says Trayvon Decked Him with One Blow then Began
Hammering His Head, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 26, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.
com/2012-03-26/news/os-trayvon-martin-zimmerman-account-20120326_1_miami-schoolspunch-unarmed-black-teenager.
142. Isabelle Zehnder, George Zimmerman’s 911 Call Transcribed, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 24,
2012), www.examiner.com/article/george-zimmerman-s-911-call-transcribed.
143. Id.
144. Id. Zimmerman also said that the individual had “his hands in his waist band,” was
going “to check [Zimmerman] out,” and had “something in his hands.” Id. Shortly after,
Zimmerman exclaimed, “These assholes. They always get away.” Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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whether Zimmerman continued to follow the person we now know to be
Martin, or if Martin approached Zimmerman.148
Zimmerman’s conversation with police dispatch lasted approximately
four minutes.149 Then, four minutes after he ended his conversation,150
Martin was dead and Zimmerman admitted to killing him151 with the “black
Kel Tek 9mm” semi-automatic handgun he had in his possession.152
People will inevitably disagree on the question of whether Zimmerman
is a racist. The answer to this question may help us determine just how
morally blameworthy Zimmerman is. What should be clear, however, is that
the suspicion heuristic could have affected his judgment that Martin posed a
threat—regardless of Zimmerman’s conscious racial beliefs. Martin certainly
fit the stereotype of a dangerous thug—an unknown, young black male,
dressed in a hoodie, walking down a street at night. And this insight is
profoundly more disturbing than believing that only consciously biased
actors would make this mistaken judgment.
The Subparts that follow trace the broad outlines of an approach to
mistakes in self-defense cases that implicate the suspicion heuristic. These
are cases where there is reason to believe that the actor’s mistaken judgment
was influenced by his or her non-conscious criminal stereotypes of the
victim.153 This analysis is important because the current doctrine’s treatment
of mistake would lead to anomalous results in suspicion heuristic cases.
Subpart A considers whether mistakes facilitated by the suspicion
heuristic should be considered reasonable or unreasonable. This inquiry is
critical because in a majority of jurisdictions the defense is unavailable if the
148. According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause, Zimmerman did continue to follow
Martin. Affidavit of Probable Cause–Second Degree Murder at 2, State v. Zimmerman, SA No.
1712F04573 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2012/04/12/us/13shooter-document.html. However, in a recent interview, Zimmerman says
that he did move to a different location, but then Martin approached him “with
‘confrontational’ body language.” Marylynn Ryan & Michael Martinez, George Zimmerman,
Trayvon Martin Case Update: Recent Interview Could Backfire in Court for Zimmerman, NEWS CHANNEL
5 (July 26, 2012), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/national/george-zimmerman-travyon-martincase-update-recent-interview-could-backfire-in-court-for-zimmerman. Even if we credit
Zimmerman’s version, which prosecutors say contradicts the statements of witnesses, it still does
not address the question of why Zimmerman did not simply drive away.
149. Eric Zorn, Trayvon Martin and the Problematic Timeline, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2012/04/trayvon-martin-and-theproblematic-timeline.html (noting that the call ended at approximately 7:13 PM); Zehnder,
supra, note 142.
150. RICARDO AYALA, SANFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT (2012), available at http://
www.wagist.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Twin-Lakes-Shooting-Initial-Report.pdf
(noting that the first officers arrived at the scene at 7:17 PM).
151. Affidavit of Probable Cause, supra note 148, at 2.
152. AYALA, supra note 150, at 3.
153. The suspicion heuristic will not always result in mistaken judgments, i.e. outcome
error. However, in this Essay, we only concern ourselves with cases in which a mistaken
judgment of criminality is made.
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mistake was unreasonable. This Subpart concludes that mistakes based upon
the suspicion heuristic should always be considered unreasonable. However,
as Subpart B explains, unreasonable mistakes in suspicion heuristic cases
should not preclude the defense. Rather, the defendant should be convicted
of manslaughter instead of murder under the doctrine of imperfect selfdefense.
A. THE REASONABLENESS DETERMINATION
In most jurisdictions, the reasonableness of an actor’s honest belief
about the necessity of using deadly force is judged from the standpoint of
the objectively reasonable person.154 But, this begs the question: who is this
fictional reasonable person to whom the defendant should be compared?155
Within criminal law scholarship, this question has engendered a lively
debate156—one that is not simply academic. For if the reasonable person is
the typical, average and ordinary person, then in suspicion heuristic cases,
individuals whose honest but mistaken judgments were influenced by the
heuristic would be acquitted. As will be discussed next, this conception of
reasonableness is inappropriate in cases implicating the heuristic.
There are two alternative conceptions of reasonableness that selfdefense doctrine could employ—the positivist and the normative.157 The
positivist model eschews normative questions. It equates the reasonable
person with the typical, average, or ordinary person and simply asks, “What
would the ordinary person do in this situation?”158 The normative
conception adds a value judgment to the inquiry. Under this model, the
reasonableness question is not only whether the typical person would have
believed and acted the way the defendant did, but also whether those beliefs
and actions are appropriate and just. The question answered is “[W]hat
should the reasonable person do”?159 The normative conception equates the

154. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
155. But see Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over the Subjectivity/Objectivity
Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 34 (2008) (arguing that “scholars have made an analytic
mistake in believing that the reasonable man is a person”; rather, “[t]he reasonable man is an
institutional heuristic” (emphasis omitted)).
156. See, e.g., Symposium on the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1
(2008); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
157. Professor Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee developed this formulation in her groundbreaking
article, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 3.
158. Id. at 495; see also id. at 387 (comparing the defendant to the “hypothetical reasonable
person of ‘ordinary intelligence, temperament, and physical and mental attributes’”) (quoting
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.05, at 202 (2d ed. 1995)). This
positivist conception is the most common model used in the law. Mayo Moran, The Reasonable
Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1236
(2010).
159. Lee, supra note 3, at 390 (emphasis added).
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reasonable person with the ideal person—someone who does not act on his
or her conscious or non-conscious biases.
Which is the appropriate model where the suspicion heuristic is
concerned? The answer likely depends in part on whether one subscribes to
the instrumentalist or non-instrumentalist view of criminal liability.160 In very
general terms, a non-instrumentalist considers the moral blameworthiness
or culpability of the actor as the criminal law’s primary concern, while an
instrumentalist focuses on using the law to promote desirable social
norms.161
The non-instrumentalist argument for using the positivist conception of
reasonableness is that punishment should be reserved for those who make
mistakes that the average person could have avoided.162 Since the typical
person cannot avoid operation of the heuristic in circumstances where it is
likely to be activated, an actor whose mistaken belief was influenced by the
heuristic is not morally blameworthy and should not be punished. This
argument for complete exoneration has some appeal, especially given the
traditional goals of the criminal law to punish only the blameworthy.
In our view, however, the reasonableness inquiry should encompass
more than typicality when the suspicion heuristic might influence
judgments; it should consider normative questions as well. This is
appropriate for a number of reasons.163 First, typical beliefs are not
160. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 815 (1994) (“The conflict between instrumental
and noninstrumental conceptions of the law stems from the fact that the law has two rather
antithetical tasks with respect to human behavior: (1) that of adjusting its rules to the
expectations and intentions [including tacit assumptions] of reasonable persons, and (2) that
of disciplining behavior and guiding it into proper channels.” (quoting LON L. FULLER &
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 700, 702 (5th ed. 1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
161. Lee, supra note 3, at 381–82. As Jody Armour writes:
Under the noninstrumental model, the law must take the human animal as he is
conditioned and simply ask whether society can fairly expect individuals to
overcome their conditioning under the circumstances. According to the
instrumentalist view, the law should seek to alter the maze and retrain individuals
by formulating rules that prevent the stigmatization of blacks, reflect the
community’s moral aspirations of racial equality, and help eradicate racial
discrimination.
Armour, supra note 160, at 815 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 785 n.12 (“Essentially,
noninstrumentalist conceptions of legal liability focus on the past actions of specific parties,
while instrumentalist ones focus on the future welfare of society in general.”).
162. See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30 (1994).
163. Joshua Dressler, in the provocation context, has argued that the positivist conception
of reasonableness can include features of the normative model. He writes:
If the Ordinary Man standard is to maintain a normative component, it is also
important that the law assume this person to be devoid of other extreme character
flaws relevant to the defense. . . . This means that, for purposes of determining
whether a person is justified in becoming indignant by an otherwise harmless act,
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necessarily morally correct or just.164 Cynthia Lee makes this point
powerfully using the examples of slavery and the Japanese internment.165
While most today consider the institution of slavery and the internment of
the Japanese unjust, this was not the case at the time.
Second, characterizing mistakes facilitated by the heuristic as
reasonable represents a judgment that the mistake is acceptable. However,
the fact that the average person is at risk of making these erroneous
judgments does not make it something that society should countenance. On
the contrary, society should be working towards eliminating racial bias,
whether conscious or not, rather than determining that it is reasonable
simply because it is ubiquitous.
Third, applying the positivist model to cases implicating the suspicion
heuristic is problematic because the heuristic is pervasive. Thus, people who
kill innocent, stereotyped individuals based upon the honest but mistaken
belief that they posed a threat would never be punished. This result would
reduce the criminal justice system’s legitimacy, especially in the eyes of those
most likely to bear the brunt of these mistaken judgments. These legitimacy
problems can have unintended and negative ripple effects throughout the
entire criminal justice system.166
In sum, using the positivist conception of reasonableness in suspicion
heuristic cases would send inappropriate messages about the value of the
victim’s life and the importance of curbing and eliminating racial biases,
whether consciously held or not. Rather, the normative conception is more
appropriate. Under it, mistakes based upon the suspicion heuristic would be
unreasonable because the ideal person would not have or act on these
mistaken judgments. The next Subpart considers whether individuals
making these unreasonable mistakes should be punished, and if so, to what
extent.

the Ordinary Man is not racist, anti-Semitic, or prejudiced against any class of
persons.
Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law,
Sexual Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 757
(1995).
164. Armour, supra note 160, at 790 (“Although in most cases the beliefs and reactions of
typical people reflect what may fairly be expected of a particular actor, this rule of thumb
should not be transformed into or confused with a normative or legal principle.”); see also LEE,
supra note 2, at 235–36.
165. LEE, supra note 2, at 236.
166. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Capers, supra note 106,
at 68–69; Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 106, at 1517.
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B. CLASSIFYING MISTAKEN SELF-DEFENSE167
In a majority of jurisdictions, self-defense is unavailable for
unreasonable mistakes, and as a result, the actor is convicted of murder.
This Subpart considers whether unreasonable mistakes precipitated by the
suspicion heuristic should be treated similarly. We conclude that they should
not. Rather, these mistakes should be classified as partial excuses that result
in reduced punishment.
1. Justification v. Excuse
Self-defense is usually considered a justification defense because,
although using deadly force against another is customarily a crime, in the
context of self-defense, the act is considered the right thing to do, deserving
of neither censure nor punishment.168 As H.L.A. Hart writes, “Killing in selfdefence is an exception to a general rule making killing punishable; it is
admitted because the policy or aims which in general justify the punishment
of killing (e.g., protection of human life) do not include cases such as
this.”169
Much has been written about the difference between justifications and
excuses in the criminal law.170 In very general terms, a justified act is one
that “the law does not condemn.”171 Some scholars define these actions as
encompassing only those that are morally right, and not those that are
merely “tolerable.”172 Other scholars are more forgiving, including within
this category acts that are simply permissible.173 The gist of this latter view is

167. This is a term coined by Reid Fontaine to distinguish between self-defense, where an
actor is both reasonable and accurate (and thus justified), and those situations in which the
actor is incorrect in his assessment. Fontaine suggests that “the doctrine of self-defense be
reframed such that cases in which there is no real defense such as in the case of a reasonable
but erroneous belief of a mortal threat be excluded and handled under a separate excusebased doctrine of mistaken self-defense.” Reid Griffith Fontaine, An Attack on Self-Defense, 47 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 57, 61 (2010).
168. Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A
Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61, 84 (1984); Fontaine, supra
note 167, at 58.
169. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 13
(1968).
170. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978); Dressler, supra note
168; R. Kent Greenawalt, Violence—Legal Justification and Moral Appraisal, 32 EMORY L.J. 437
(1983); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Society Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal
Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). Unfortunately, the constraints of this Essay do not allow
a full discussion.
171. HART, supra note 169, at 13–14.
172. George P. Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse
for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1355, 1358–59 (1979).
173. Donald Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122 (1986) (writing that justifications are not necessarily “a good thing,
but merely . . . a tolerable outcome in view of the alternative outcome”).
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that “what you did was really all right,” even if not ideal.174 The main idea
behind justifications is that the actor has done the right thing under the
circumstances; in context, the act is not wrongful, and thus the actor should
not be punished for engaging in it.
An excuse, on the other hand, focuses on the actor’s moral
blameworthiness, and not on the act.175
When behavior is excused, the law recognizes the behavior as
wrongful, but does not assign blame to the actor because he is
considered nonculpable. In recognizing excuse defenses, the law
recognizes that people may act in socially undesirable ways, yet not
deserve punishment. The law accepts the inevitable shortcomings
of human beings who cannot always act in ideal ways.176
Excuses, then, acknowledge the social harm of the act, but also recognize
that the actor did not have a “conscious will to do evil.”177 Because the actor
is not fully responsible for his or her actions based upon some psychological
or situational characteristic unique to him or her, the actor receives either
reduced punishment (a partial excuse) or no punishment at all (a full
excuse).178
While self-defense is typically considered a justification defense, difficult
classification issues arise when an actor makes an unreasonable mistake of
fact regarding the need to use deadly force.179 Is mistaken self-defense still
174. Greenawalt, supra note 170, at 442–44 (internal quotation marks omitted). Elsewhere,
Greenawalt has written that justified acts are those that are “warranted” and “morally
appropriate.” Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 89, 91 (1986); see also Fontaine, supra note 167, at 62 (describing justified acts as
acceptable or permissible).
175. Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature,
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1987) (“Whereas a justification negates the social harm of an
offense, an excuse negates the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.”);
Horowitz, supra note 173, at 111 (“[Excuses] go, in short, to the mental element in criminal
liability.”).
176. Lee, supra note 3, at 390 (citation omitted).
177. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 111 (noting that an excuse “belongs to that part of the
criminal law that removes from punishment defendants who have intended no wrong.”). As
Professor Reid Fontaine writes, “an excuse is the combination of an admission that one has
engaged in wrongdoing that has produced social harm and an exonerating explanation as to
why he has so acted.” Fontaine, supra note 167, at 66.
178. Dressler, supra note 168, at 66 (“[A]n excuse concedes the wrongfulness of the act,
but asserts that the actor should not be punished for her wrongful behavior, primarily because
of psychological or situational involuntariness.” (citations omitted)); HART, supra note 169, at
13–14 (noting that the excusable act “is deplored, but the psychological state of the agent . . .
rule[s] out the public condemnation and punishment”).
179. Some commentators argue that both reasonable and unreasonable mistakes are fully
excusable. One commentator put it thus:
If . . . moral stigma is not merely relevant but indeed the only distinguishing factor
of the criminal law from civil law, it follows that any mistake of fact, no matter how
unreasonable, should exculpate. Since, by definition, a person who makes even an
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justifiable when facilitated by the suspicion heuristic? One answer is to
conclude that these mistakes are neither justifiable nor excusable. The
problem with this is it would treat individuals whose mistakes are facilitated
by the heuristic identically to actors who kill with malice. However, the
former are not as culpable as those “who act while they are not mistaken,
who know precisely what they are doing, and understand precisely the
implications and potential results of their acts.”180 Thus, these two groups
should not receive equal punishment.
Another option is to treat these mistakes as justifiable. However, this is
also problematic because
the perceived offender has acted in no way that would adequately
change the moral balance of the relationship between the victim
and killer. As such, the victim has not acted such that he deserves
to die or in a way that entitles the killer to take his life. . . . [T]here
exists no characteristic—related to the victim or otherwise—of such
a scenario that gives rise to entitlement on the part of the killer.181
Hence, classifying mistaken self-defense as justifiable is inappropriate
because using deadly force against an innocent victim is not “objectively
right conduct,”182 even if the mistake was influenced by the heuristic. It is
not socially desirable or even tolerable to kill, maim, or otherwise mistakenly
use deadly force against innocent stereotyped individuals simply because
most people have non-conscious biases against them.183 If these mistaken
judgments were categorized as justifiable, it would suggest that people are
privileged to—and should—act in similar ways in analogous situations.184
unreasonable mistake of fact is not as culpable as one who makes no mistake of
fact but who understands precisely what he is doing, the criminal law should visit
upon the unreasonably mistaken actor a penalty less severe than that visited upon
the knowing actor and, indeed, should visit upon him no criminal penalty at all.
Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II—Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self
Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 513 (1987); see also Edwin R. Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the
Criminal Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1908) (“If the defendant, being mistaken as to
material facts, is to be punished because his mistake is one which an average man would not
make, punishment will sometimes be inflicted when the criminal mind does not exist. Such a
result is contrary to fundamental principles, and is plainly unjust . . . . If the mistake, whether
reasonable or unreasonable, as judged by an external standard, does negative the criminal
mind, there should be no conviction.”).
180. Singer, supra note 1179, at 513.
181. Fontaine, supra note 167, at 61.
182. Dressler, supra note 168, at 63 (citing GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
(1978)). In Dressler’s view, justifications need not always involve “objectively right conduct.” Id.
at 64. He writes, “Sometimes mistaken conduct can be justified, not merely excused.” Id.
183. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
184. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 119 (“To recognize a justification defense is effectively to
change the law and, at least in some cases, to weaken the prohibitions of the criminal law. For if
a person in a given situation is justified in doing an act that would otherwise be denominated
criminal, then all others similarly situated are likewise privileged to do the same act.”).
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Yet, there is no normatively defensible reason to approve the killing of
innocents simply because they have the misfortune to be stereotyped as
criminal185 and the average person likely has non-conscious biases against
them.186
Finally, the doctrine could excuse the actor who makes a mistake based
upon the suspicion heuristic. We conclude that this is the appropriate way to
handle these honest but unreasonable mistakes of fact. This taxonomy
recognizes that while the act of using deadly force against innocent victims
who fit a criminal stereotype is not morally appropriate, the actor’s mistake
is understandable. The excuse classification acknowledges that these actors
did not have the conscious intent to engage in wrongful conduct. Rather,
their mistake was influenced by non-conscious and automatic mental
processes over which they had little control.187
Categorizing mistaken self-defense as an excuse does not end the
inquiry, however. We must still determine whether, in the suspicion heuristic
context, the excuse should exonerate the actor (a full excuse) or simply
reduce punishment (a partial excuse). The next Subpart considers this
question.
2. A Partial Excuse
While mistaken judgments in the suspicion heuristic context are
excusable, the pervasiveness of the heuristic makes it materially different
from situations where actors are fully excused because of infancy, insanity,
or some other unique characteristic. These traits are peculiar to the
individual and thus, “[t]he mental quality of [these] excuse defenses
prevents their recognition in individual cases from effectively changing the
law.”188 Not so with the suspicion heuristic. As discussed previously, the
suspicion heuristic likely affects most individuals, regardless of their
conscious racial beliefs.
Because the heuristic is ubiquitous, fully excusing mistaken judgments
of criminality precipitated by it would essentially immunize the mistaken
killing of innocent, but stereotyped-as-criminal, individuals from
punishment. This would tacitly turn mistaken self-defense into a justification
185. Fontaine, supra note 167, at 62 (noting that it is generally argued that a justified act is
one that is encouraged and not prohibited).
186. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 26–27, 80–81 and accompanying text. This also suggests that if
individuals place themselves in situations where the suspicion heuristic is likely to affect them,
they might be culpable. There is also evidence that with sufficient motivation and long-term
practice, individuals can reduce the effects of automatic implicit biases. See Richardson, supra
note 36, at 2054 (citing studies); id. 2088–97 (discussing possible methods that might reduce
implicit bias, but noting that, at present, these efforts may not produce long-lasting effects); see
also Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009).
188. Horowitz, supra note 173, at 120.
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defense. So, while we can understand why mistakes based upon the
suspicion heuristic might occur, full exoneration of everyone who
erroneously uses deadly force against those stereotyped as criminal does not
comport with our common intuitions.
A partial excuse provides a way to balance the concerns raised by
punishing the non-culpable actor with a murder conviction on the one hand
and condoning the use of deadly force precipitated by racial stereotypes
through complete exoneration on the other.189 A partial excuse recognizes
that it is not only undesirable to completely forgive the use of deadly force
against innocents based upon the suspicion heuristic, but also that these
actors do not deserve full punishment. Rather, some punishment is
defensible because the law should not condone the taking of an innocent
life based upon racial stereotypes—consciously held or not. Reduced
punishment recognizes that using deadly force under these circumstances is
wrong while also acknowledging the actor’s lack of malicious intent.
Under current law, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense provides the
mechanism for treating mistaken self-defense as a partial excuse. Imperfect
self-defense mitigates murder to voluntary or involuntary manslaughter
when an actor’s belief is honest but unreasonable.190 However, only a
minority of jurisdictions recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense,
although this number is growing.191 Based on the analysis in this Essay, we
believe that the option of imperfect self-defense should be available in all
jurisdictions.
3. Operationalizing the Reasonableness Standard
The discussion thus far has been theoretical. In this Subpart, we
consider how to apply the normative standard of reasonableness in actual
cases involving mistaken judgments of criminality.
First, just like in cases that do not involve mistaken judgments, the
initial question jurors would have to answer is whether the actor’s belief in
the necessity of using deadly force was honest. If the jury decides the actor’s
belief was not honest, then the defendant’s actions are neither justifiable
nor excusable, and he or she should be convicted of murder.
However, if the jury finds that the mistaken belief was honest, then it
must consider whether the actor’s belief was reasonable. How can courts
operationalize the normative conception of reasonableness? One way would
be for courts to adopt a modified version of the jury instruction that Lee
proposes. Her suggested instruction reads, in part, “If the defendant was

189. Some commentators argue that unreasonable mistakes should not be excused. See, e.g.,
Fontaine, supra note 167 (expressing the view that only reasonable mistakes are excusable with
one limited exception).
190. Dressler, supra note 168, at 85.
191. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 121, at 234–35.
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influenced by racial stereotypes, this fact may be considered to support the
honesty, but not the reasonableness, of the defendant’s beliefs. Reliance on
racial stereotypes to inform one’s beliefs in a self-defense situation is not
reasonable as a matter of law.”192 We would add to this instruction language
to the effect that racial stereotypes can be both conscious and nonconscious, and that reliance on either type of stereotype is unreasonable as a
matter of law.193
Of course, juror decision-making itself may be affected by conscious and
non-conscious biases. In other words, a juror’s own implicit or explicit
stereotypes may affect his or her determination of normative reasonableness.
To help reduce this possibility, we adopt Lee’s suggestion of giving jurors a
race-switching instruction.194 The instruction would tell jurors:
Race-switching involves imagining the same events, the same
circumstances, the same people, but switching the races of the
parties. . . . If your evaluation of the case before you is different
after engaging in race-switching, this suggests a subconscious
reliance on stereotypes. You may then wish to reevaluate the case
from a neutral, unbiased perspective.195
This supplemental jury instruction would reinforce to jurors that reliance on
stereotypes when determining whether the defendant’s mistaken belief was
normatively reasonable is inappropriate. It might also provide an effective
means for jurors to evaluate whether their own decisions were influenced by
racial stereotypes, either conscious or not. The race-switching instruction
should be given whenever a party requests it or the judge determines that it
is appropriate.196 If the jury finds that the actor’s mistake was unreasonable,
then it can find the actor guilty of manslaughter instead of murder under
the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.
III. THE DUTY TO RETREAT
The suspicion heuristic reveals that the right to act in self-defense can
place those stereotyped as criminal at greater risk of death or serious bodily
injury at the hands of those who honestly, but mistakenly, fear them. In the
Subparts that follow, we consider whether the law of self-defense can help
insulate against these tragic outcomes by imposing a duty to retreat. First, we
192. Lee, supra note 3, at 479.
193. Some might bristle at the idea of judges giving instructions such as this one. Some
might even argue that it is inappropriate. However, U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa Mark Bennett already gives jurors supplemental instructions that address the
effects of racial stereotypes on judgments. Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of
Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson,
and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 169 (2010).
194. Lee, supra note 3, at 481–82.
195. Id. at 482.
196. Id. at 468.
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discuss the history of the duty to retreat from the English common law to the
modern “Stand Your Ground” laws. Then, we suggest that the trend in most
American jurisdictions to abandon the retreat requirement pays insufficient
attention to the role of mistake. Finally, we argue that the duty to retreat
should be a requirement of all self-defense laws.197
A. HISTORY
1. English Common Law
The English common law required a person attacked in a public place
to make every attempt to retreat to a place of safety before using deadly
force to protect himself. The reason for this was that killings done solely to
protect oneself (se defendendo killings) were considered excusable, not
justifiable.198 Thus, if the actor failed to retreat when he could have before
using deadly force, he would be convicted of murder. Justifiable homicides,
on the other hand, did not impose a duty to retreat.199 However, these
homicides were limited to those executed in furtherance of the law,200 such
as killing a felon who had escaped capture, committed a capital crime, or
already been sentenced to death.201
Distinguishing between justifiable and excusable homicides at common
law could become complicated when a person was defending himself against
an attack by a felon. In these cases, only if the felon was engaged in a capital
crime against the actor was the killing considered justifiable.202 Surprisingly,
however, only the killing of would-be robbers was justifiable.203 All other
homicides, including those in which the actor was defending himself against
an attempted murderer who did not intend to rob him, were classified as se
197. We do not consider whether the duty should extend to one’s home because no
jurisdiction requires this.
198. Garrett Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence
in the Evolution of the Anglo-American “Retreat Rule,” 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 307–08
(1992). A se defendendo killing was one where “a man may protect himself from an assault or the
like, in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.” Id. at 308–09
(quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184).
199. See id. at 309.
200. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 568 (1903).
Or, as Blackstone put it, for a homicide to be justifiable “the law must require [the killing].”
Epps, supra note 198, at 308 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 198, at *178) (alteration in Epps).
201. Epps, supra note 198, at 307–08; see also Beale, supra note 200, at 568.
202. Epps, supra note 198, at 309; Singer, supra note 179, at 471–72.
“[I]ndeed, because he or she was carrying out a public duty by preventing a felony,
one could almost argue . . . that the slayer had a duty not to retreat. Rather than
seeking to excuse the slayer’s behavior—as with the slayer se defendendo—the slayer
in a ‘felony prevention’ situation was attempting to justify his or her act, claiming
that he or she was right in so acting.”
Id. at 472.
203. Beale, supra note 200, at 572 (providing explanatory sources).
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defendendo homicides, requiring the actor to retreat before using deadly
force.204
2. United States Doctrine
Across the ocean, the law developed differently.205 Some American
jurisdictions followed the common law approach, imposing a duty to retreat
in se defendendo homicides.206 The majority of jurisdictions, however,
departed from the English common law rule.207 In these jurisdictions, no
retreat was required as long as the individual was “without fault” and “in a
place where he has a right to be.”208
For instance, in Erwin v. Ohio, the defendant and his son-in-law were
involved in a dispute concerning the right to use a shed that was not in the
curtilage of either’s property.209 Days before the homicide, the son-in-law
removed all the defendant’s tools from the shed and put a new lock on the
door.210 On the day of the homicide, the defendant had removed the locks
and was storing his tools in the shed when the two argued. The son-in-law
approached the shed with an axe on his shoulders and the defendant
warned him not to enter.211 When the victim got to the door, the defendant
shot him dead.212
At trial, the court instructed the jury on the duty to retreat over the
defendant’s objection.213 On appeal, the court held that when a defendant is
not at fault, there is no duty to retreat, writing:
The question, then, is simply this: Does the law hold a man who is
violently and feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought
such necessity upon himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly
from his assailant when he might have safely done so? The law, out
of tenderness for human life and the frailties of human nature, will
not permit the taking of it to repel a mere trespass, or even to save
life, where the assault is provoked; but a true man, who is without
fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous
bodily harm.214
204. See id. at 572–73.
205. For a general history of the duty to retreat in the U.S., see RICHARD MAXWELL BROWN,
NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY (1991).
206. See, e.g., Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150, 175–77 (1860).
207. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 123, at 229.
208. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877).
209. Id. at 192.
210. Id. at 192–93.
211. Id. at 193.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 193–94.
214. Id. at 199–200.
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The Erwin court decided that this rule was “the surest to prevent the
occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this, by letting the would-be
robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know that their lives are, in a
measure, in the hands of their intended victims.”215
Other courts that rejected a duty to retreat in the same time period
reasoned similarly. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court wrote:
The tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly
against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee
when assailed, to avoid chastisement or even to save human life,
and that tendency is well illustrated by the recent decisions of our
courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of self-defence.
The weight of modern authority, in our judgment, establishes the
doctrine, that, when a person, being without fault and in a place
where he has a right to be, is violently assaulted, he may, without
retreating, repel force by force, and if, in the reasonable exercise of
his right of self-defence, his assailant is killed, he is justifiable.216
In a line of cases replete with inconsistencies and confusion,217
culminating in Brown v. United States,218 the Supreme Court held that there
was no duty to retreat. Brown involved a fight between employees at the site
of a new post office that resulted in death. At trial, the court instructed the
jury on the duty to retreat.219 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
with Justice Holmes writing in a now famous passage:
Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an
uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition
of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider
whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with
safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.220
Today, only a minority of jurisdictions recognize a duty to retreat.
3. Stand Your Ground Laws
Recently, states have replaced the duty to retreat with “Stand Your
Ground” laws. Florida was one of the first states to pass such a law, so we will
consider that statute specifically here.221 However, many states have since
passed statutes modeled on Florida’s law.222

215. Id. at 200.
216. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877).
217. See Epps, supra note 198, at 316–22 (discussing the Court’s “acrobatics”).
218. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921).
219. Id. at 342.
220. Id. at 343 (citing Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 558 (1896)).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012). See generally Anthony J.
Sebok, Florida’s New “Stand Your Ground” Law: Why It’s More Extreme than Other States’ Self-Defense
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Prior to its passage in 2005, Florida’s self-defense statute justified the
use of deadly force only when the actor “reasonably believe[d] that such
force [was] necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm . . . or
to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony.”223 The state
recognized the common-law duty to retreat, which provided that the use of
deadly force was justified only after the actor “use[d] every reasonable
means to avoid . . . danger,” unless the actor was in his or her own home.224
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law made major changes to existing law.
Among other things, it eliminated the duty to retreat when the actor was in a
“place where he or she has a right to be.”225 The intent of the law was “to
restore [the] absolute rights of law-abiding people to protect themselves . . .
from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action”226

Measures, and How It Got That Way, FINDLAW (May 2, 2005), http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/sebok/20050502.html.
222. Alabama (ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2011)); Arizona (ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411 (2010 & Supp. 2011–2012)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-23.1
(West Supp. 2011)); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-2 (West 2012)); Kansas (KANS. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5230 (2011)); Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.055(3) (West Supp. 2011));
Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20 (2007 & Supp. 2012)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS §
780.972 (2007)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (2006)); Missouri (MO. ANN. STAT. §§
563.031(3), 563.074 (West 1999 & Supp. 2012)); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-110
(Supp. 2009)); Nevada (NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.120 (Supp. 2009)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 627:4 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2011)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1451.3 (2011)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25 (2002 & Supp. 2012));
Pennsylvania (18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505 (1998 & Supp. 2012)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-11-440 (Supp. 2011)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2006));
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611 (2010)); Texas (TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32
(2011)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402 (2008 & Supp. 2011)); Washington (WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.16.050 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-722 (LexisNexis 2008)).
223. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012.
224. State v. James, 867 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
225. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3). Section 776.013(3) provides:
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force
if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.
Id. Today, the majority of American jurisdictions have abandoned the retreat requirement.
Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend: Alabama Abandons the Duty To Retreat and Encourages Citizens
To Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 339 (2008); Epps, supra note 198, at 311–14.
226. S.B. 436, 107th Leg., 37th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005). As Representative Dennis K. Baxley
declared, the statute stakes out “a clear position that we will stand with victims of violent attacks
when the law is in their favor.” Abby Goodnough, Florida Expands Right To Use Deadly Force in SelfDefense, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/27/national/27shoot.html.
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and to “abrogate[] the common law duty to retreat when attacked before
using deadly force.”227
B. THE ROLE OF MISTAKE
Neither the English common law nor “Stand Your Ground” laws
consider the role that mistake should play in the context of the duty to
retreat.228 Under the English common law, this failure can be attributed to
the fact that “the primary weapons were knives, swords, poles and the like”
and not guns.229 Because these weapons required close contact, mistakes
about the victim’s deadly intent likely were rare.230
Today, however, the ready availability of guns increases the likelihood
of mistakes since a person can no longer rely upon close physical proximity
to deduce the victim’s intent. Yet, in almost every jurisdiction abrogating the
duty to retreat in the U.S., the rationale centers on the rights of innocent
people to defend themselves against dangerous individuals.231 There is no
recognition of the reality of mistaken judgments. Perhaps this absence is
related to the fact that the ready availability of guns may make retreat
dangerous. However, the duty to retreat has never required individuals to
retreat when it is not completely safe to do so.
Failing to impose a duty to retreat, when it can be accomplished with
complete safety, privileges the life and autonomy interests of law-abiding
actors over potential victims. Perhaps this balance is appropriate when one
imagines the culpable victim who is the initiator of a deadly conflict.232 After
all, it could be said that these culpable victims assumed the risk of death, or
perhaps even forfeited their right to life, based upon their wrongful
conduct.233 The same obviously cannot be said about the law-abiding, but
stereotyped-as-criminal, victim. Hence, the failure to impose a duty to retreat
either rests on the faulty premise that individuals do not make mistaken
judgments, and thus, a duty to retreat is unnecessary, or that it simply does
not matter that mistaken judgments occur. Both premises are problematic.

227. FLA. S. JUDICIARY COMM., SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, S.
19-CS/CS/SB 436, 1st Reg. Sess., at 5 (2005), available at http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/
session/2005/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2005s0436.ju.pdf.
228. Singer, supra note 179, at 474 (“[W]riters did not even discuss the effect of mistake in
either justifiable or excusable self defense . . . .”).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 214–27 and accompanying text.
232. But see Beale, supra note 200, at 581 (“It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is
ten times more distasteful to kill.”).
233. Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 871, 883 (1976) (“Starting with a general right to life possessed by all human beings, the
argument is that the aggressor, by his culpable act, forfeits his right to life. This analysis,
however, is unsatisfactory on a number of counts.”).
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Given that mistaken judgments occur, and are even more likely when
the victim fits a criminal stereotype, the choice to privilege the autonomy
interests of law-abiding actors over law-abiding victims is not an obvious one.
In order to recognize and potentially protect the liberty and security
interests of those stereotyped as criminal, as well as other victims of mistaken
judgments, the law should require a duty to retreat. This is discussed next.
C. A PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE
The elimination of the duty to retreat is premised on concern for the
safety and autonomy interests of law-abiding actors and a failure to
recognize the heightened risk of mistaken judgments against those innocent
individuals who are stereotyped as criminal. Imposing a duty to retreat
would more appropriately balance the interests of both mistaken actors and
innocent victims. Requiring retreat is especially important because the
actors include civilians. If the only people entitled to act in self-defense were
police officers, there might be a stronger argument against imposing a duty
to retreat because officers could be required to engage in training aimed at
reducing the effects of the suspicion heuristic on their judgments. However,
it would be more difficult to require civilians to participate in such trainings,
even if they were effective.234 Thus, the best way to safeguard against
mistaken judgments caused by the suspicion heuristic is to impose a duty to
retreat when it is safe to do so.
We are not arguing that the duty to retreat would always accomplish the
goal of saving an innocent life. Citizens would need to learn about the duty
to retreat before it might influence their behavior. Furthermore, in the heat
of the moment, individuals may not be aware that a safe avenue of retreat is
possible. However, there are certainly circumstances where imposing a duty
to retreat could make the difference between life and death for the innocent
victim. And without it, there is no mechanism to at least attempt to protect
stereotyped individuals from the risk of death or serious injury due to
mistaken judgments.
The retreat requirement also has the potential to serve a debiasing
function in suspicion heuristic cases. Retreat would force individuals to take
a “time out” before acting on their intuitions. Withdrawing to a place of
safety, if possible, might release some anxiety and give people time to
engage in more deliberate, conscious, and effortful thinking. The duty
might allow individuals an opportunity to consider alternatives, rather than
jumping to conclusions on the basis of limited information.

234. We could imagine requiring such trainings as a requirement for obtaining a gun
license. However, without consistent practice, the requirement would be ineffective. See Adam
Benforado, Quick on the Draw: Implicit Bias and the Second Amendment, 89 OR. L. REV. 1, 57–59
(2010) (arguing that gun owners be required to engage in mandatory ongoing training).
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Furthermore, requiring retreat would help to clarify the intent of the
victim. If, upon retreat, the victim continues to pursue, this decreases the
likelihood of a mistaken judgment. Thus, the duty to retreat could reduce
the ambiguity often inherent in cases of self-defense.
Finally, imposing a duty is also consistent with the classification of
mistaken self-defense as excusable. An excuse, as discussed above, focuses on
the moral blameworthiness of the actor. If a defendant knows he can retreat
safely before using deadly force, but chooses not to, he is no longer morally
innocent.
The duty to retreat should be a mandatory requirement of all selfdefense laws. The Model Penal Code (“MPC”)235 and some states236 already
impose such a duty. Given the national attention the shooting death of
Martin has received, the time is ripe for change. Already, many prosecutors
and law enforcement officials oppose “Stand Your Ground” laws237 and some
states are considering proposals to repeal or amend them.238
If a duty to retreat becomes a mandatory component of self-defense
laws, how would it affect the analysis of mistake in suspicion heuristic cases?
In cases where no safe avenue of retreat exists, no change in analysis is
necessary. The actor should be partially excused for the reasons discussed
previously.239 However, what should happen in situations where a safe
avenue of retreat does exist? The answer depends on whether the actor is
aware of it. If the actor is unaware that retreat is possible, we would treat this
situation as analogous to the case where no safe avenue exists. The actor
should be partially excused.240 But, if the actor is aware of the safe avenue of
235. The MPC provides that “[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . if . . . the actor
knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (Official Draft 1985).
236. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 2004).
237. Goodnough, supra note 226; Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right To Shoot in SelfDefense, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/07/us/07shoot.html.
238. See, e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, Stand Your Ground: Michigan Act Similar to Florida Law
Used in Trayvon Martin Case Provokes Repeal Effort, HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/18/stand-your-ground-michigan-law-florida-trayvonmartin-self-defense-act_n_1527349.html; Hayes Hunt, “Stand Your Ground” Laws—The Trayvon
Martin Case & Neighborhood Watch Groups, FROM THE SIDEBAR (Apr. 9, 2012),
http://practiceview.muzeview.com/links/index.php?id=3670757 (reporting that a group of
Florida legislators has created a task force to consider whether the Stand Your Ground law
should be amended or repealed); see also Adam Cohen, The Growing Movement To Repeal “Stand
Your Ground” Laws, TIME IDEAS (Apr. 16, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/16/thegrowing-movement-to-repeal-stand-your-ground-laws.
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. In jurisdictions that currently recognize the duty to retreat, the defendant must be
aware that a safe escape exists before the duty applies. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note
121, at 230, 255; see also Redcross v. State, 708 A.2d 1154, 1158 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998). We
believe that subjective awareness of the duty to retreat is important because due to the stress of
the encounter, individuals may not be able to think clearly enough to recognize that a safe
avenue of escape exists. As Kenneth Simons observes, based on scientific evidence, “[i]n the
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retreat, then the actor is no longer entitled to an excuse because his or her
failure to avoid the use of deadly force by retreating makes him or her
culpable and a murder conviction would be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Scholars, lawyers, and policymakers should attend to the ways that
normal psychological processes can bias decisions and outcomes in ways
inconsistent with the values our society treasures. The stakes to liberty,
safety, and security are too important to ignore. What is required is a new
language that can account for these biases—one that does not rely upon the
fiction of the rational decision-maker or the scapegoat of the consciously
biased actor. Because the suspicion heuristic invokes implicit biases that are
collectively created and reinforced, ameliorating it suggests a kind of shared
responsibility. Put another way, because there is shared responsibility with
regards to creating implicit biases,241 there is a moral argument to be made
in favor of a shared responsibility for their consequences. This is consistent
with the principles of community policing242 and procedural justice,243 now
championed by much of progressive law enforcement.
The suspicion heuristic begins to provide a broader language for
engaging notions of bias in criminal justice without requiring a discussion of
an individual’s character. If the declining pervasiveness and severity of racial
bigotry is to be taken seriously,244 then it is exactly this sort of language that
will become increasingly necessary in order to make sense of persistent
inequalities. More importantly, the consensus among mind scientists is that
malicious intent is not a necessary condition of discrimination or inequality.
Yet, without a language with which to engage contexts in which racial
fast-moving context of a violent attack, it is often unrealistic to expect the person attacked to
consciously and carefully evaluate the precise extent of a threat, the likely effect of his response
on the aggressor, and the availability of alternatives.” Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable
Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51, 78 (2008).
241. See, e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 40, at 476; Devine, supra note 20, at 5–6;
Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1464–65 (supporting existence of implicit
biases).
242. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING,
CHICAGO STYLE (1997) (discussing the importance of police departments working with the
community to solve problems); ROBERT TROJANOWICZ & BONNIE BUCQUEROUX, COMMUNITY
POLICING: HOW TO GET STARTED (2d ed. 1998) (same).
243. See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49–57 (2002) (discussing the importance of
community involvement to effective law enforcement); Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral
Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as
Prototypical Representatives of a Group’s Moral Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153 (2003)
(demonstrating that people are more likely to work with the police when they believe the police
share their moral values); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003) (exploring the
relationship between procedural justice and the public’s views of the police).
244. Bobo, supra note 110, at 1196; Goff, Steele & Davies, supra note 67, at 91.
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inequality is produced and maintained in the absence of racial bigotry, the
law is severely limited in its ability to apply a remedy to objectionable racial
discrimination.
This Essay outlined the psychological mechanisms that frequently result
in racially biased perceptions and judgments of suspicion, and some
attendant behaviors that follow these initial perceptions.245 While this
represents a first step towards a necessary expansion of the legal reasoning
and doctrine around suspicion, our review was limited to a discrete analysis
of the perceiver. Psychological processes, however, exist in a much wider
and more dynamic network of agents and contexts, all of which can
influence a given perceiver and, more importantly, the outcomes of a given
encounter.
For instance, some contexts may provoke non-Whites to behave more
suspiciously—in actuality—than Whites behave.246 In fact, one’s concern
with being perceived as criminal may literally cause one to behave more
anxiously, which can in turn lead to perceptions of “suspicious” behavior.
These types of situational cues can accumulate, leading to what, in our
upcoming work, we refer to as suspicion cascades247—the waves of social and
psychological factors that can literally produce a social reality of suspicion
where one did not exist before. And, of course, these waves tend to crash
harder on stigmatized group members than on dominant ones.
Similarly, beyond the domain of self-defense concerns regarding racial
bias in criminal suspicion, there are a host of legal domains in which
pervasive and unintentional psychological biases could play a key role. Given
the fundamental role that human psychological processes play in
perceptions, emotions, and behaviors, it must follow that the biases
influencing suspicion would also affect policing decisions, employment
decisions, decisions about allocating political goods (e.g., voting rights), and
jury deliberations. Consequently, legal scholars should understand the ways
in which these nearly universal “traps of the mind” influence our ability
to treat individuals from different groups fairly. The need for a broader
language to address these “traps” therefore becomes clear.
In sum, fixating on whether or not individuals harbor bigoted beliefs
can make it difficult to see the larger context in which the socio-political
245. This Essay used the lens of behavioral realism, an approach to the law that calls upon
courts and legislature to base legal rules on the best available evidence that exists on how
people behave rather than on common sense assumptions. See generally Symposium on Behavioral
Realism, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006).
246. Cynthia J. Najdowski & Phillip A. Goff, Presentation at the Fourth Int’l Cong. on
Psychol. & Law, Stereotype Threat in Police Encounters: Why Innocent African Americans Are
at Risk of Being Targeted as Suspects (Mar. 4, 2011).
247. See Phillip Atiba Goff & L. Song Richardson, No Bigots Required: What the Science of Racial
Bias Reveals in the Wake of Travyon Martin, in PURSUING TRAYVON MARTIN: HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
AND CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATIONS OF RACIAL DYNAMICS (George Yancy & Janine Jones eds.)
(forthcoming fall 2012) (discussing suspicion cascades).
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construction of race shapes our very perceptions and behaviors that operate
beneath conscious awareness.248 Though overt racism continues to plague
American hearts and minds, the path towards racial justice requires a
broader lens than one that telescopes conscious intentions to the exclusion
of other factors. Those who have lost their lives in the shadow of racially
suspect behaviors deserve better than a legacy of distraction and inquisitions
about character. In other words, in addition to combating the individual
overt bigotry that inhabits our hearts and minds, it is time for us to take
equally seriously the shared unconscious biases that lurk beneath the
surface. Because, if we are concerned with the targets of racism—and not
just racist actors—then we must acknowledge that bigotry is not a necessary
condition for the reproduction of racial disparities of all types.

248. See Thomas C. Holt, Marking: Race, Race-Making, and the Writing of History, 100 AM.
HIST. REV. 1, 1 (1995) (noting that “‘race’ inheres neither in biology nor in culture but must be
summoned to consciousness by their encounters in social space and historical time”).
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